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Abstract: Grice in pragmatics and Levelt in psycholinguistics have proposed models 
of  human communication where the  starting point  of communicative action is  an 
individual  intention.  This assumption,  though,  has  to  face serious  objections  with 
regard to the alleged existence of explicit representations of the communicative goals 
to be pursued. Here evidence is  surveyed which shows that in fact  speaking may 
ordinarily be a quite automatic activity prompted by contextual cues and driven by 
behavioural schemata abstracted away from social regularities. On the one hand, this 
means that there could exist no intentions in the sense of explicit representations of 
communicative  goals,  following  from  deliberate  reasoning  and  triggering  the 
communicative action. On the other hand, however, there are reasons to allow for a 
weaker  notion  of  intention  than  this,  according  to  which  communication  is  an 
intentional  affair,  after  all.  Communicative action is  said to  be intentional  in  this 
weaker sense to the extent that it is subject to a double mechanism of control, with 
respect both to present-directed and future-directed intentions.
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0. Introduction
The intuition that human communication has in essence an intentional character has led to 
theories having the notion of communicative intention at their core. The most famous examples are 
Paul Grice's theory in the domain of philosophical pragmatics, and Willem Levelt's psycholinguistic 
theory.  While Grice was engaged in a philosophical project  mainly focussing on the normative 
dimension of rationality underlying communication, Levelt's concern with the cognitive processes 
of language production commits him to a fully psychologically realistic attitude towards the notion 
of  communicative  intention.  In  other  words,  for  his  theory  to  work  one  has  to  assume  that 
communicative intentions exist and have in fact a causal role in producing linguistic behaviour.
However,  such  a  realistic  attitude  towards  individual  communicative  intentions  is  not 
accepted  uncontroversially.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  rejected  by  philosophers  like  Daniel 
Dennett  and  anthropologists  such  as  Alessandro  Duranti.  Their  critiques  mainly  concern  the 
assumption that speakers represent their communicative goals in advance of producing utterances. 
These  objections  have  often  been  intended  as  if  they  were  directed  against  the  whole 
epistemological  enterprise  of  cognitive  explanation  of  behaviour.  Yet,  recent  studies  on  goal-
directed action in the domains both of individual and social psychology suggest now a different key 
of  interpretation:  the  point  is  not  that  individualistic  explanations  as  such  miss  something 
substantial, but rather that goal-directed behaviour might not be in general conscious and controlled.  
Specifically, there might not always be explicit  representations of goals at  the beginning of the 
causal chain leading to communicative behaviour.
In communication as well, a major role might be played by individual habits trained in the 
context of social routines. One should not draw the conclusion, though, that conscious and strategic 
processes play no role at all in communication. Quite on the contrary, we intend to claim that in a 
sense, despite its prevalent automaticity, human communication is nonetheless a quite intentional 
affair – though not in the standard sense according to which intentions play a direct causal role in 
each communicative act. Our proposal is rather that goal-directed behaviours are subject to a double 
control mechanism: firstly, the online control exercised by executive processes; and secondly, the 
control exercised in the long run by the subject herself through explicit propositional consideration 
of behaviour rationality. The combination of these two mechanisms ensures that the goals driving 
behaviour coincide normally with the intentions we would have – if only there were intentions to 
guide our behaviour.
1. Communicative intentions
Grice  (1989)  has  been  the  first  to  develop  a  global  theory  of  communication  as  an 
intentional activity, but it is Levelt (1989) who changed Grice's insight into a fully psychological 
commitment,  with his model of language production: in this model, communicative intention is 
conceived as a first step in the process leading to articulation. More precisely, at the beginning of 
this process Levelt puts a module he calls “the Conceptualizer”, having a communicative intention 
as input and a preverbal message as output. 
Talking as an intentional activity involves conceiving of an intention, selecting 
the  relevant  information  to  be  expressed for  the  realization  of  this  purpose, 
ordering this information for expression, keeping track of what was said before, 
and  so  on. These  activities  require the speaker's  constant  attention.  (Levelt 
1989, 9)
According to Levelt, an intentional activity “serves a purpose the speaker wants to realize” 
(idem, 20) and is “by definition”, under some central control. Instead, when an activity is not under 
central  control  it  has  to  be  considered  automatic,  in  that  it  is  achieved  “without  intention  or 
conscious awareness”.
As Levelt emphasizes, automatic processes are more efficient than controlled ones, in the 
sense that they are not limited by the span of working memory and can be performed in parallel 
with other processes, quickly and with few mistakes. On the other hand, a draw-back of automatic 
processes is their being inflexible. So Levelt proposes a modular model of language production, 
where some modules are under speaker's control while others are not. Specifically, the steps under 
speaker's  control  are  the  first  and  the  last  ones,  that  is,  respectively,  the  preverbal  message 
production  and  the  final  Monitoring.  Evidence  of  this  contribution  of  controlled  processes, 
according to Levelt, is the fact that we do not entertain a fixed number of intentions that we have 
learned  once  and  then  use  again  and  again,  rather  we  can  conceive  of  an  infinite  number  of 
intentions  and means apt  to  achieve  them,  while  taking  into account  the  infinite  variability  of 
contexts. However, since when producing an utterance we cannot plan everything, there must be 
some division of labour between automatic and controlled stages.
Now, nobody wants to deny either that speaking is an intentional activity – in the limited 
sense that it accomplishes some subject's purpose other than just producing correct utterances – or 
that speaking is a kind of flexible behaviour. The point standing in need of further consideration, 
according to us, is rather: does this necessarily imply a conscious control?
2.  Against communicative intentions
Despite  its  intuitive  plausibility,  the  assumption  that  human  behaviour  is  guided  by 
intentions  has  been  questioned  by  philosophers  like  Daniel  Dennett  or  anthropologists  like 
Alessandro Duranti.
Dennett  is  famous,  amongst  other  things,  for  his  thesis  according  to  which  intention 
attribution is part of an explanatory strategy which does not commit us in any way to the existence 
of such things as intentions. In fact intentions would exist – so to speak – only in the eyes of the 
observer  when she adopts what  Dennett  (1989)  calls  the “intentional  stance”.  One of  his  chief 
arguments to this effect concerns the alleged semantic indetermination of intentions: as it is well 
known by philosophers, it is far from easy to say exactly which beliefs and desires are involved in a 
single action. There are so many beliefs and desires potentially involved, and so many ways we 
could phrase them! These considerations concern linguistic behaviour in an obvious way: when we 
say that communication is a form of intentional behaviour, are we postulating the existence of a 
determinate  intention  as  a  causal  trigger  of  the  communicative  action?  Levelt  appears  to  be 
confident that communicative intentions have (or, better, produce) a determinate pre-verbal content, 
given in a language of thought. Fodor's language of thought hypothesis, though, has been seriously 
undermined by empirical and theoretical considerations: it seems clear that words are correlated to 
modal representations, while there is no evidence for amodal representations of the kind Fodor had 
in mind (e.g. Barsalou et al., 2003). In any case, it is not clear that adopting Fodor's hypothesis can 
solve the problem of meaning indetermination in Levelt's framework:  if  we entertain  conscious 
communicative intentions in a language of thought, why is it in general so difficult to say exactly 
what our intention is?
Duranti  (1998, 2007) proposes a  quite  radical  answer to this  question:  either  we do not 
entertain conscious communicative intentions at all, or, even in case we do, these intentions are not 
what does really matter. Linguistic behaviour is embedded in social routines which have a social 
normative “strength” of their own. Consequently,  what  a  speaker does in a  conversation is  not 
simply what she consciously thinks she is doing: when we enter a routine it is this routine which 
essentially decides for us. We could speak here of sort of proxy-intentions: intentions we might not 
entertain  consciously,  or  even represent  at  all,  but  that  are  socio-normatively  embedded in  the 
behaviours we are engaged in.
One would be tempted to reject those objections in the face of the strong intuition that our 
behaviour  is  directed toward goals,  is  (in part) conscious,  and is  flexibly open to an indefinite 
variety of contexts. The point, however, is whether we have reason to think that these three features 
are  combined  in  the  expected  way  –  that  is,  whether  behaviours  are  triggered  and  guided  by 
conscious representations of goals and whether this is the reason why they are so flexible. There is 
growing evidence that this picture is wrong for one aspect or the other.
3. Automatic goal-directed action
In the last two decades, a large body of research in social and individual psychology has 
shown that in human behaviour goal pursuit can be non-conscious and automatic.
To start  with,  Bargh and colleagues have conducted pioneering research on unconscious 
mimicry  of  others  (Bargh  1989;  Dijksterhuis  et  al.  2007).  This  work  initially  focussed  on 
“inconsequential actions” where one does not expect any real goal to be involved: foot shaking, 
nose rubbing and the like. However, the road was open to the hypothesis that generally speaking our 
behaviour  is  unconsciously  affected  by  others  more  than  we  are  inclined  to  concede.  In  fact, 
subsequent work has shown the same pattern in goal-directed actions as in non purposive ones. For 
instance,  the  presence  of  significant  others  seems  to  unconsciously  activate  specific  attitudes 
towards pursuing goals (Fitzsimons and Bargh 2003). Other studies have also shown phenomena of 
unconscious goal contagion by others (Dijksterhuis et al. 2007, 100).
Moreover,  it  has  been  shown  that  priming  goals  “automatically  activates  behavior 
representation and resultant action according to an 'if-then' rule, enabling the goal-directed behavior 
to occur directly and independent of conscious intentions” (Dijksterhuis et al. 2007, 105). In those 
experiments goals are for the most part explicitly stated, so the results do not count as evidence that 
people act without explicit intentions. However, the experiments are revealing with regard to the 
pervasive  role  of  habits  in  goal-directed  actions.  Habits  are  presumably  stored  as  behavioural 
patterns in our long term memory by means of associations between goals, behaviours and contexts. 
In the experiments cited above, associations of that sort might explain the priming of actions which 
are  frequently  used  to  reach  the  primed  goals.  But,  once  we  assume  the  existence  of  such 
associations, there is no reason why we should not expect that contextual cues – instead of goals – 
might directly trigger actions on occasion.
This conclusion seems supported by the comparison between animal and human studies. de 
Wit and Dickinson (2009), in order to account for a number of results in animal studies, draw a 
complex model where two different routes interact in the selection of action. One route is based on 
an outcome-response mechanism, where the  representation of the expected outcome trigger  the 
response, while the other route lean on a response-outcome mechanism, where the expectation of 
the outcome follows the response rather than preceding it. The scholars suggest that  this model 
could apply to human cognition as well, and that the response-outcome route might prevail when 
humans are involved in routinized activities.
Continued reinforcement should strengthen the S → R [stimulus – response] 
association in the habit memory to such a degree that the presentation of the 
stimulus can reliably trigger the motor unit for the response before the longer 
feedback pathway through the associative  memory can evaluate  whether  the 
outcome is currently a goal for the animal. (idem, 471)
In  other  words,  at  the  moment  that  behaviour  is  initiated  the  outcome  might  not  be 
represented at all, or at least, the representation of the outcome might not be the reason why the 
behaviour is initiated – since the subject has not yet evaluated whether the expected outcome is one 
of her goals.
In general terms, routinization of goal-directed actions can be described as “the effective 
delegation of (part of) action control to the external environment and its stimuli, so that its effective 
functioning resembles a stimulus-response reflex, which is much less demanding than attentional 
control” (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi 2009, 568). An impressive illustration of this phenomenon has 
been given through stimulation of cingulate motor area in epileptic patients. When stimulated, these 
patients  produced  a  variety  of  coordinated  manual,  buccal  and  oculomotor  actions.  Most 
interestingly, as soon as they were given an object during stimulation, a complex pattern of object-
related movements was evoked.
For example, when one patient was given a cigarette, they lit and smoked it in a 
compulsive manner, stopping smoking when stimulation ceased, and restarting 
when stimulation restarted. (Pacherie and Haggard forthcoming)
This sort of evidence seems to show the existence of a brain circuit for automatic selection 
of  behaviour,  based  on  the  storage  of  routinary  actions  and  the  automatic  triggering  of  these 
routines by means of environmental stimuli.  In this line, Pezzulo and Castelfranchi (2009, 568) 
underline the importance of introducing in their own model of goal-directed systems a feature not 
included in “traditional control-theoretic models”, that is, “the assumption that action schemas can 
be automatically activated by objects and events (including social ones)”.
The impact of such considerations on the issue of communication is enlightened by Garrod 
and Pickering (2007). In assessing Levelt's  model, they ask themselves whether considering the 
actual dialogic format of linguistic performances would make any difference. Their answer puts 
emphasis on the fact that “[i]n dialogue, what one interlocutor says imposes constraints on what her 
partner  can say next.  For example,  a  question usually  requires  an answer.”  As a  consequence, 
dialogue  “may  make  production  more  automatic”  (idem,  10).  Here  reference  is  made  to  the 
existence of verbal routines delivering automatic processing. Answering to a question is largely an 
automatic response, triggered by the question itself without any deliberate consideration of goals. It 
should be noticed, however, that these routines may not only concern linguistic behaviours such as 
question-and-answer  pairs:  social  routines  of  any  sort  could  constrain  types  of  communicative 
moves. For instance, Levinson (1992) has proposed that we store in memory – on the basis of social 
regularities we are exposed to – a large variety of “activity types”, conceived of as “goal-defined, 
socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on participants, setting, and so on, but above 
all  on the  kinds of  allowable  contributions”  (idem:  69).  Activity  types are  supposed to  have  a 
sequential structure, as far as they prescribe which moves, be they communicative or not, one has to 
perform at any point of a given activity. The participation to such social regularities can therefore be  
expected to produce routinization of behaviour of the kind envisaged by Garrod and Pickering; as a 
consequence, as soon as the agent is engaged in social interactions, she is prompted to react quite 
automatically to preceding pieces of behaviour in accordance with the shared procedures.
The conclusion  to  be drawn seems to  be that  Dennett's  and Duranti's  intuitions  pointed 
toward some robust cognitive facts: human behaviour is not always caused by explicit, conscious 
representation of the goal to be subsequently pursued; this happens, amongst other things, because 
we are exposed to routinary social  actions,  which in the course of time become automatic  and 
therefore  gain  some  strength  of  their  own;  this  is  why,  in  turn,  people  can  act  without  any 
determinate idea of their goals – in many cases there were no goals, in fact, and one has to infer 
them from behaviour, social regularities and previous personal propensities.
4. Doing without intentions?
Should we then conclude that intentions simply do not exist, except from the side of the 
observer? Not exactly.
Let us concede that we should better not speak of intentions unless there is, in advance (and 
as a cause) of acting, an explicit  representation of the goal to be pursued. To be true, the most 
accurate philosophical definitions of “intention” are even more demanding than this:  they make 
reference to a practical reasoning procedure whose result is the representation of an explicit goal – 
as Bratman (1987) puts it, intentions are terminators of practical reasoning about ends (see also 
Pacherie  2006).  The  psychological  literature  seems  ready  to  embrace  this  definition,  too:  for 
instance, Aarts and Custers (2009, 319) distinguish between goals and intentions on the basis of the 
fact that the latter “are the product of conscious deliberation”. In line with such definitions, we 
could justifiably say that in most cases human behaviour is not driven by intentions.
However, here is where one feels the urge to accommodate two opposite but equally strong 
intuitions.  On the  one  hand,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  human actions  are  ordinarily  driven  by 
intentions which are freshly produced as a result  of  deliberative processes; in fact,  as we have 
shown, there is evidence that our goal-directed behaviours can be quite automatic instead. On the 
other hand, there is a strong intuition that what distinguishes human from non-human action (and 
communication) is its intentional, voluntary nature. How can these two intuitions be accommodated 
within a single picture? Our answer is that canonical intentions, despite their being very infrequent, 
occupy nonetheless a crucial position in human behaviour, while plain automatisms play a very 
modest  role  in  our  lives.  Our  “automatic”  behaviours  are  always  couched  within  a  complex, 
multiple control system.
We will now address the question at two different levels: the online control that executive 
system performs on current behaviour, and the way in which conscious decisions and deliberative 
processes may affect even our automatic drives. These two levels partially parallel the traditional 
distinction  between  intention-in-action  and  prior  intention  (Searle  1983),  or  between  present-
directed and future-directed intention (Bratman 1987; see also Pacherie 2006).
4.1 Online control
It  would  be  misleading  to  think  of  automatic  habitual  actions  as  if  they  were  wholly 
inflexible. If this were the case, only a little part of human behaviour – and certainly not linguistic 
behaviour – could be automatic. To be true, as de Wit and Dickinson (2009) observe, even the 
behaviour  of  other animals  is  far  from being  rigidly inflexible  in  any case.  In  fact,  the  model 
proposed  by  de  Wit  and  Dickinson  is  also  intended  to  explain  how  a  significant  amount  of 
flexibility can be obtained (both in animals and in humans) thanks to a complex system of forward 
plus backward associations between stimuli, responses, outcomes and rewards. Does this system 
appeal in humans to the intervention of conscious and controlled executive processes? Maybe not – 
at  least,  not  in  many  cases.  Even  the  selection  amongst  existing  behavioural  schemata,  their 
hierarchical organization, and the feedback control of the fit between intended and actual outcome, 
seem often to be performed without consciousness. Nonetheless, Hassin et al. (in press) concede 
that, in the face of novel and non(wholly)-routinized circumstances, a flexible behaviour seems to 
require the involvement of working memory and executive functions, though they claim that also 
these effortful controlled processes must not be conscious.  However,  Jeannerod and co-workers 
have shown that this depends on the difficulty of the task (Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998): there are 
cases in which the task obliges subjects to consciously attend to their own behaviour and its fit with 
the intended outcome. In such cases an explicit conscious representation of the goal is needed for 
behaviour control, even if this representation is not what has triggered the action at first.
But conscious control seems to have a much wider range of applications than just situations 
where achieving goals is difficult or problematic (contrary to what  Dijksterhuis et al. 2007 have 
suggested). Recall the compulsive behaviours obtained through stimulation of cingulate motor area 
in epileptic patients, referred to by Pacherie and Haggard (forthcoming). If, on the one hand, this 
sort  of  evidence  shows  clearly  the  existence  of  behavioural  schemata  apt  to  be  automatically 
triggered by environmental cues in the appropriate conditions, on the other hand it is quite apparent 
that human behaviour is normally not as rigidly prompted by the mere presence of external stimuli 
as it  was in those experiments. Rather, compulsive behaviours of that sort are typically attested 
when executive system is pathologically disrupted, as in the famous case of Phineas Gage: he could 
not help being distracted by objects which prompted stereotyped behaviours, so that he had become 
unable  to  coherently  pursue the higher-level  goals  involved in his  daily  duties (Damasio et  al. 
1994). The maintenance of high-level goals and their “shielding” from environmental stimuli are 
essential for pursuing what Pezzulo and Castelfranchi (2009, 564) call “distal intentions”:
distal  intentions require extra mechanisms to support self-regulation over long 
periods  of  time;  these  are  the  hallmark  of  executive  functions,  such  as  the 
ability to ‘shield’ these intentions from distracting opportunities, and dedicated 
memory mechanisms. The passage from proximal to distal action is therefore a 
major evolutionary step, requiring a sophisticated form of control.
An integral part of what we call intentional behaviour is precisely this ability to maintain 
current courses of action while inhibiting alternative ones, especially stimulus-dependent responses. 
This feature of intentional behaviour apparently concerns more the pursuing of goals than their 
previous selection: an action is deemed intentional in this sense to the extent that the appropriate 
goal  is  consistently  pursued,  without  any  requirement  that  this  goal,  having  been  consciously 
selected,  be the  triggering cause of  action.  At  the  same time,  the  above-mentioned mechanism 
clearly involves much more than mere bottom-up activation of behavioural routines: it rather calls 
for  a  top-down process  where  consciously  adopting  a  goal  is  a  key  prerequisite  for  its  being 
pursued.
It seems that a crucial role in this process is played by a brain circuit encompassing both 
lateral and orbital prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. These areas, as summarized by 
Fuster (2001, 324), are essential for the organization of goal-directed actions:
The anterior cingulate seems involved in the motivation to perform them [i.e., 
goal-directed actions], the orbitofrontal cortex in the suppression of distractions 
that interfere with them, and the lateral cortex in the mediation of their cross-
temporal contingencies.
A well supported model of the role played by prefrontal areas in conscious control appeals to 
the  formation  of  “reentrant  loops”  in  the  cortex.  According  to  Dehaene  and Naccache  (2001), 
prefrontal cortex must cause top-down amplification of sensory and motor neuronal assemblies in 
order for sensory-motor representations to become conscious. More precisely, local assemblies need 
to be independently activated through bottom-up processes,  and then merged in a larger circuit 
involving “higher association cortices interconnected by long-distance connections and forming a 
reverberating neuronal  assembly with distant perceptual  areas” (Dehaene et  al.  2006, 205).  The 
formation  of  such  self-sustained  long-distance  loops  is  then  believed  to  produce  a  “global 
workspace”, which might account for both conscious integration of information and its maintenance 
in working memory until current goals have been accomplished.
Interestingly, top-down processes mediated by prefrontal cortex not only may maintain goal-
directed  actions  by  amplifying  the  activation  of  current  behavioural  schemata  and  actively 
inhibiting alternative ones; besides, they can also probably affect automatic processing involved in 
pursuing goals. As Kiefer (2007, 293) puts it: “A given attentional (or intentional) state might be 
necessary for unconscious stimuli  to trigger further processes”.  More specifically,  Kiefer  adopts 
Neumann's (1990) theory of “direct parameter specification”, according to which
[Subjects] search for information in order to specify free parameters within the 
currently active intention/action plan. Unconsciously registered information that 
resembles this searched-for information is selected and processed to specify the 
free  processing  parameters.  Therefore,  unconsciously  perceived  information 
will translate into behavioural effects that are absent if the same information is 
sufficiently dissimilar from the searched-for features. (Kiefer 2007, 300)
In  other  words,  attentional  amplification  due  to  top-down intentional  processing  allows 
stimuli to affect behaviour even when they are not consciously perceived.
In sum, there is large evidence that intentions-in-action, or present-directed intentions, have 
an important role to play in human cognition – specifically, i) in the execution of new and difficult 
tasks, ii) in inhibition of alternative courses of action, iii) in the processing of unattended stimuli. 
This is not to say that human agents are driven by intentions with a precise propositional content. 
All we have seen so far is, rather, consistent with the hypothesis that present-directed intentions 
consist in the attentive amplification of sensory-motor assemblies globally representing actions in 
contexts. Furthermore, even assuming that those assemblies code for goal-oriented action schemata, 
it is far from clear that intentional control requires goals to be explicitly attended in any moment, 
and  in  particular  that  they  have  to  be  attended from the  beginning.  Quite  on  the  contrary,  an 
automatically activated response might as well support a present-directed intention, to the extent 
that it is part of a goal-directed behavioural schema.
If we transfer our tentative conclusions to language processing, we might plausibly say that 
speaking  is  intentional  in  the  sense  of  present-directed  intentions:  it  is  an  attentional  activity, 
relatively shielded from distracting stimuli, and clearly affected by top-down processes. This does 
not  rule  out  the  possibility  that  our  communicative  moves  are  largely  specified  by  schemata 
automatically activated by environmental cues, in line with the previously considered suggestions 
of Garrod and Pickering (2007).
4.2 Future-directed intentions and practical reasoning
While present-directed intentions, as we just claimed, are presumably an integral part of our 
communicative behaviours, planning those behaviours in advance seems to be something that only 
exceptionally occurs. To analyze the issue more precisely, we should better trace here a distinction 
between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  capacity  to  plan  in  advance  to  do  something  when  certain 
circumstances obtain and, on the other hand, the ability to perform reasoning procedures in order to 
establish what would be preferable to do in certain circumstances.
With  regard  to  the  first  point,  Pacherie  and Haggard  (forthcoming)  recall  the  notion  of 
“implementation intention” (Gollwitzer 1999) as a crucial component of prospective memory, that 
is, the capacity of remembering to perform an action in the future. Implementation intentions can be 
defined as “specific plans that identify both an appropriate goal-directed response and a suitable 
situation in which to initiate that response” (Webb and Sheeran 2007, 295). Specifically, the subject 
recall  (or  create  anew)  an  if-then rule,  where  the  then-component  relates  to  the  goal-directed 
response while the if-component relates to the situation offering a suitable opportunity to act. As a 
consequence, implementation intentions are expected to enhance the accessibility of the specified 
situational  cues,  and  also  “to  forge  an  association  between  that  cue  and  a  response  that  is 
instrumental  for  obtaining  one’s  goal”  (idem,  296),  thus  facilitating  action  initiation  in  the 
appropriate circumstances. In a sense, implementation intentions are similar to routinization, in that 
both create associations between environmental cues and behaviour, with the difference that the 
former  is  a  “one-shot”  decisional  process  –  that  is,  forming  the  association  does  not  require 
repetition.
In  the  same  vein,  Hommel  (2000)  speaks  of  “prepared  reflexes”,  that  is,  cases  where 
“intentional processes do not actually carry out S-R translation, but only configure the cognitive 
system to do so automatically, once the defined target stimulus arrives” (idem, 265). Just as present-
directed  intentions  seems  to  affect  unconscious  processing  (let  us  recall  the  “direct  parameter 
specification” theory), so prepared reflexes show the existence of complex patterns of interaction 
between automatic and future-directed intentional components:
although intentional states may determine which rules are selected, formed, and 
implemented,  once  they  are  established,  stimuli  seem  to  have  direct  and 
uncontrolled  access  to  these  rules,  leading  to  automatic  translation  via 
intentional routes. (idem, 261)
Hommel  also  addresses  a  different  kind  of  interaction  between  intentionality  and 
automaticity: the case where they conflict each other. A well-established paradigm in psychology 
consists in studying the effect  of will  by contrasting it  with overlearned habits that  need to be 
overcome. Specifically,  a particular S-R association is  first  acquired through extensive practice, 
then subjects are required to react to the same stimuli with different responses. Since at this point a 
controlled, effortful process is needed to counteract the now dysfunctional habit, two consequences 
are expected:
(1)  increased  reaction  time  to  stimuli  previously  associated  with  a  different 
response;  and  (2)  increased  occurrence  of  […]  “intended  errors”,  that  is, 
production of the previously associated but now incorrect response. (idem, 252)
On the one hand, this means that habits may gain a certain autonomy from intentions: de Wit 
and Dickinson (2009, 471) speak in this sense of “behavioural autonomy” with regard to the way in 
which “slips of action occur when well-practiced responses intrude to compromise our goal-directed 
behaviour”. On the other hand, however, it  is important to underline that,  difficult  as it  can be, 
intentional actions sooner or later succeed in overcoming habits – to the point that after practice 
intended behaviours undergo a similar process of routinization and become habits. Prior intentions 
can  therefore  affect  our  present  behaviour  in  at  least  two  ways:  through  the  effects  of 
implementation intentions, and through routinization of intended actions. In both cases, automatic 
behaviour  can follow as  a  consequence  of associations  formed under  the control  of intentional 
processes.
Interestingly, intentional preparation of automatic behaviours also plays a key role in the 
insightful analysis of free will offered by Dennett (2003). Based on Kane's (1996) proposal, Dennett 
makes the claim that free will is not incompatible with automaticity; quite on the contrary, since our 
conscious decisional processes need time, we had better routinize a large part of processing in order 
for us to be ready for rapidly reacting to environmental stimuli in exactly the way we intended to 
do. Furthermore, as we showed previously, intentional action might require that we overcome some 
habits, and this might require in turn that intentional action is routinized, if any efficiency has to be 
gained.  In  other  words,  habits  can  be  an  essential  instrument  for  preparing  ourselves  to  make 
difficult  choices,  so as to be forced to do the right thing at  the right  moment.  This intentional 
preparation of automatisms is what Kane calls “self-forming actions”.
Until now, we have considered how, given a goal, people may facilitate its accomplishment 
by creating new associations; nothing has been said about the way we settle the goals to be pursued. 
In  a  rather  trivial  case,  “our”  goals  could be  something we have  simply  been told to  do.  For 
example, the doctor prescribes us to assume a pill, and we find it useful to associate this goal with 
some daily routine which may help us not to forget it. Or, for another example, the ski instructor 
explains us how to correct a wrong position, and we keep trying until the old routine is substituted 
by the correct one. In both cases, there needs to be no direct and explicit assessment of the specific 
goals at play: rather, we defer to someone else to whom we accord the authority to tell us what is 
the best things for us to do – of course, we have a personal interest in our health, or in skiing, but 
we do not need to explicitly attend to the rational relationship between these overarching goals and 
the immediate goals we are adopting.
A different case is when we do explicitly consider our behaviour's effects, and the reasons 
why we should, or should not, produce those effects. These are genuine cases of practical reasoning 
on ends, delivering genuine intentions – in accordance with Bratman's definition. Of course, it does 
not  happen frequently  that  we stop acting in  order  to  reflectively consider  pro and con of  our 
courses  of  action,  and  the  worthiness  of  their  respective  goals.  However,  we  should  not 
underestimate  the  role  of  deliberative  processes  in  our  lives.  Firstly,  one  single  episode  of 
deliberation may possibly affect many future behaviours in that they are all directed towards the 
same deliberated goal. Secondly, each deliberation may have a great number of consequences also 
because of the generality of its conclusions. Suppose, for instance, that you decide to learn skiing: 
you could be inclined to search for a ski instructor even without any explicit deliberation, just 
because you have in other circumstances reflected on the importance of being taught by experts. 
Thirdly, we should consider how often we engage in social practices involving the evaluation of 
behaviours and goals: starting from parental education and going on with school teachers, friends 
and then colleagues, we are continuously confronted by situations where reasons for behaviours are 
given and asked for. This social space of rational discussion allows us to repeatedly reconsider how 
appropriate and justified our and others' behaviours are. Finally, it should be taken into account the 
internalization  of  such  social  dialogic  aptitude  towards  considering  reasons  for  action,  and 
comparing  actions  with  norms  and values.  Even when we  act  automatically,  social  as  well  as 
idiosyncratic norms of action may be activated and affect our behaviour in many ways. For all these 
reasons, we can expect that in the long term most of our habitual goals have been assessed by some 
sort of rational deliberation.
In sum, given the variety  of  ways in  which intentional  decisions may shape habits  and 
automatisms, it does not seem inconsistent to claim that many automatic behaviours might have 
been caused by prior intentions. This conclusion applies to communicative behaviours as well. For 
instance,  we could  bring  forth  the  communicative  intention  to  give  a  certain  information to  a 
colleague the next time we meet her – a clear example of implementation intention. Or we could 
reflectively consider how appropriate  is to give that information. But even in the ordinary case 
where  the  precise  content  of  our  communicative  behaviour  is  not  figured out  in  advance,  that 
behaviour is constrained in various respects by the way in which prior deliberated intentions have 
shaped our habits.
5. Conclusions
It  might  be  true,  and  probably is,  that  we often do not  need to  be  conscious from the 
beginning  of  the  goals  we are  pursuing,  but  representations  of  such  goals may nonetheless  be 
activated at some point to some extent, and may be strategically attended when needed. Similarly, it 
is certainly true that in most cases our behaviour is not delivered through conscious deliberation, 
but  nonetheless  we  ordinarily  pursue  goals  that  at  some  point  in  our  experience  have  been 
consciously  perceived as worthy of being pursued.  In  a  prototypical  sense,  then,  intentions are 
representations of outcomes, they follow from explicit deliberation,  are causally responsible for 
subsequent  action  and  involved  in  its  conscious  control.  However,  we  would  call  an  action 
“intentional” also when it is directed towards a goal we could have adopted consciously, if only we 
had considered it, and when this goal can be represented in the service of conscious control of 
behaviour when needed.
It seems clear to us that communication is almost invariably intentional in the latter sense: 
we are immersed in a host of habits to the point that we hardly need to reflectively choose the kind 
of communicative move we are going to perform; nonetheless, the outcomes of our behaviour are 
soon represented as expectations, can be recruited for executive control of action, and can also be 
recognized by subjects as their own goals. Human communication is mostly an intentional activity 
without intentions – without any deliberate selection of goals as a causal determinant of current 
action.
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